A phone call is a weak control, and too many Australians treat it as the gold standard
If bank details change, a verbal callback on its own is not enough. For high-risk Australian payments — especially invoices, deposits and property settlement money — you need a documented verification chain before the transfer is released.
I take a hard line on this because the loss usually happens before anyone works out they were dealing with a compromised email account, a spoofed domain, or a false sense of urgency. Once an electronic funds transfer is sent, recovery is uncertain, time-sensitive and often ugly.
That is why I want readers to look at Transfer Guardian. Its main value is domestic Australian payment verification: checking who you are paying before money leaves your account, and reducing payment-redirection risk between Australian businesses and individuals. International checks are available, and foreign exchange is part of the broader international side, but the core issue for most readers is local: Australian account details, Australian counterparties, Australian money going to the wrong place.
The common mistake is trusting the channel instead of the counterparty
Most people get this wrong in one specific way. They think the question is whether the email, SMS or phone call looks genuine. It is not. The real question is whether the bank account belongs to the intended payee and whether the change was authorised by that payee.
An email thread can be genuine right up until the point an attacker inserts one fraudulent message. A caller ID can be spoofed. A polished PDF proves nothing. Even a familiar contact name proves very little if the underlying address has been altered by one character.
That is why a callback by itself is weak. If your callback number comes from the same compromised email that sent the new account details, you have simply moved from one unverified channel to another. You have not verified the payee. You have verified the fraudster’s process.
Property settlements and invoices share the same failure point
Australians often separate “business invoice fraud” from “property settlement fraud”. Operationally, they fail in the same place: someone accepts changed banking instructions without a proper verification chain.
In a property matter, that may involve a conveyancer, solicitor, lender, real estate agent or developer. In business, it may involve accounts staff, a bookkeeper, a director or a family member paying a supplier. The labels differ. The weakness is the same.
There is no single Australia-wide statute that says “you must verify bank details this way before paying an invoice”. But there are very real consequences when controls are poor: internal fraud losses, negligence arguments, disputes with service providers, insurer scrutiny, and sometimes regulator attention depending on the sector and representations made to customers.
For financial firms, Australian financial services and credit licensees operate in a broader compliance environment shaped by ASIC, AFCA, APRA standards where relevant, and duties to maintain adequate risk management systems. For everyone else, the pressure is more practical but no less serious: if your process is sloppy, the money can be gone before lunch.
The safer rule: no changed details are acted on without two independent checks
My position is simple: if payment details change, do not process the transfer until you complete two independent checks, with at least one outside the incoming communication chain.
That means:
- not relying on a phone number contained in the change request;
- not relying on a forwarded email thread as proof;
- not treating a prior payment to the same supplier as proof the new account is legitimate; and
- not assuming urgency justifies skipping process.
For many households and businesses, that sounds excessive. It is not. It is proportionate to the speed and finality of modern payments.
The five-part verification chain worth using
Here is a process people can actually use. If account details change, or if a first-time payment is large, do all five.
- Freeze the payment. Do not release funds on the basis of the change request alone. Mark the invoice, settlement statement or payment instruction as “pending verification”.
- Verify the contact point from a trusted source you already hold. Use the phone number from your signed engagement letter, earlier contract, supplier onboarding record, official website you independently typed in, or a known switchboard. Do not use the number in the email asking for the change.
- Ask a closed question the fraudster is unlikely to answer. Good examples include: “Please confirm the last invoice number we paid and the amount,” or “Please confirm the property address and the trust account name exactly as shown in the retainer.” Avoid open prompts like “Can you confirm your bank details?” which invite the wrong person to feed you the fraudulent details again.
- Use independent payment verification. Use a service built for this risk. That is where Transfer Guardian fits. The point is to verify who you are paying before the money leaves your account, rather than relying on appearances or assumptions.
- Record the verification outcome. Keep a dated note of who verified, what source was used, and what was confirmed. If there is any dispute later, memory is useless. Records matter.
If one of those steps cannot be completed, the transfer should not proceed.
The script your accounts team should use word for word
Most payment errors happen because staff improvise. Give them a script.
“We do not accept changed bank details by email alone. Before any payment is released, we need to verify the account through our independent process. Please expect a short delay while we complete that check.”
And for the callback:
“I’m calling using the number we already have on file. I am not asking you to restate bank details from email. I need you to confirm that your organisation has changed payment instructions, and I need a second independent verification before we process any transfer.”
That wording matters. It stops staff from accidentally reading out and reconfirming the fraudulent account details.
Why “we’ve paid them before” is not a defence
This is another mistake people make. They think an established relationship lowers the risk. In fact, familiar counterparties are often more dangerous because people stop checking.
If a supplier has been paid for three years and suddenly sends new account details, that is precisely when controls should tighten. Fraud relies on routine. The attacker is counting on the accounts team saying, “They’re one of ours, just put it through.”
The same applies to property transactions. The fact that you have been dealing with the same firm for weeks does not mean late-stage account changes are safe.
What to do in the first hour if you already paid the wrong account
Speed matters.
- Call your bank immediately and report a mistaken or fraudulent transfer. Ask for urgent action to attempt recall or recovery.
- Contact the intended payee using trusted contact details and tell them not to act on any supposed payment confirmation until the issue is checked.
- Preserve evidence. Save emails, headers, invoices, SMS messages, payment receipts and call logs.
- Report the cyber incident to ReportCyber if a business email compromise or related cyber offence is involved.
- Notify affected internal decision-makers straight away. Delays caused by embarrassment increase losses.
Your bank’s options will depend on timing and the receiving account status. Fast reporting does not guarantee recovery, but slow reporting materially worsens your position.
One useful governance rule for families, farms and small business
If you run a family business, a farm, a medical practice, a trade business or a self-managed property portfolio, adopt one rule now: no single person can approve a changed payee account and release the payment on the same day.
That is not red tape. It is a control. It forces a pause, reduces pressure decisions, and creates a second pair of eyes. The larger the payment, the stronger that rule should be.
Shane St Reynolds works across finance, property, governance and dispute-heavy matters, and this is one of those areas where a small procedural fix prevents a very expensive argument later. If your business also deals with lending, capital raising or transaction structuring, see Poseidon Finance. For broader commentary on law, risk and public-interest issues, see shanereynolds.com.au.
General information only; get advice for your facts before acting.
Before you send another large payment, put a proper check in place
If your current control is “we call to make sure”, it is weaker than you think. For Australian domestic payments, the better question is whether you have independently verified who is being paid before the funds leave your account.
Use a real verification process. For many readers, that starts with transferguardian.com.au.
If you want help tightening your payment controls, property transaction process or risk settings, book a consultation at https://shanestreynolds.com/contact, email [email protected] or call 08 6263 6236.
